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Sterilization, State Ac~ion, and the Concept of 
Consent 
Monroe E. Pricet and Robert A. Burttt 
A line demarking the propriety of state intervention into the 
lives of individuals has never been adequately drawn. It is not sur-
prising that such a line is practically nonexistent, from the point of 
view of legal analysis, when the people subject to intervention are 
considered mentally retarded. Too infrequently the medical and 
privacy rights of these individuals go unrecognized and unheeded. 
There are several factors which collectively account for this. 
First, there has been an historic absence of litigation' in this 
area, owing in part to the situation surrounding the putative plain-
tiff, and to the great difficulties in obtaining vigorous, competent 
counsel for the retarded. Secondly, state intervention in this area 
usually takes place in the context of medical care and habilitation, 
those therapeutic and merciful characteristics of state action which 
by their very nature have never been welcome subjects for judicial 
review, even when administered on an involuntary basis. 
Moreover, state intervention among the retarded involves 
rights2 which are often taken for granted by the population at large 
and are only compromised with respect to special groups. These 
include: the right to have sexual relations, to marry, and to have 
children; the right to receive adequate medical treatment, in the 
sense that the decision of whether life support systems should be 
maintained must not rest merely on whim or prejudice; and the 
Copyright <I) 1975 by Monroe E. Price and Robert A. Burt. This article was 
prepared for the President's Committee on Mental Retardation and, with other 
essays prepared under the same auspices, will shortly be published by The Free 
Press as THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW. 
t Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. 
tt Professor of Law and Professor of Law in Psychiatry, University of Michi-
gan. 
1. Fewer than 25 cases involving sterilization of the retarded had reached 
appellate courts by 1968. See, e.f?., Comment, Compulsory Eugenic Sterilization; 
for Whom Does the Bell Toll? , 6 DuQ. L. REV. 145 (1968). 
2. The right to marry and procreate are parts of the "right to privacy" which 
is not guaranteed in so many words in the Constitution but has been held to be 
"so basic and fundamental and so deep-rooted in our society" as to come under 
the protection of the ninth amendment. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965) . 
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right to personal dignity, to be fed, clothed and sheltered in a man-
ner which is neither brutalizing nor shameful. In its programs for 
the retarded, the state interferes with these rights in oflband ways, 
often without recognizing the existence of the right which has been 
abridged. In a sense, not only has our legal system condoned such 
approaches, but it has institutionalized the procedures and tech-
niques which are used by the state to deprive retarded persons of 
their rights. In this article we wish to focus on the techniques of 
deprivation rather than on the specific rights involved. 
The most flexible method used by states to deprive the men-
tally retarded individual of his rights, and then shield that depriva-
tion from challenge, involves manipulation of the concepts of con-
sent and voluntariness. In this discussion we will explore a most 
peculiar aspect of the doctrine of consent which is heavily used in 
the state's dealings with the mentally retarded-third-party con-
sent. 3 This type of consent is really nothing short of an extended 
conceit on the proposition of voluntariness. It is a fiction which 
authorizes the state to intervene because a party other than the 
subject provides the green light. Often that third party is the parent 
of the subject individual, but the doctrine is equally applicable 
when the third party is a doctor, the superintendent of a facility, a 
guardian ad !item, or a conservator. By characterizing the transac-
tion as "consensual" rather than "compulsory," third-party consent 
allows the truly involuntary to be declared voluntary, thus bypass-
ing constitutional, ethical, and moral questions, and avoiding the 
violation of taboos.4 Third-party consent is a miraculous creation of 
the law-adroit, flexible, and useful in covering the unseemly real-
ity of conflict with the patina of cooperation. 
The doctrine's administrative efficacy has caused it to play an 
important role, for good or ill, where mentally retarded persons are 
concerned. Admission to state hospital facilities, various forms of 
treatment, experimental drug programs, and state control of sexual 
behavior are all conducted under this rubric .5 In this discussion, we 
3. Ordinarily a fully competent adult is able to give consent in his own behalf. 
Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906) . Such consent involves two parties: 
the patient (!st-party) and the physician (2nd-party). Where a guardian renders 
consent for his ward, the guardian is the third-party consenter . 
4. Lobotomized inmate of state mental hospital placed in custody of father to 
receive electroshock therapy at private facility ; held, not an involuntary detention 
prevented by state Welfare and Institutions Code. Farber v. Olkon, 40 Cal.2d 503, 
254 P.2d 520 (1953). 
5. Another field of endeavor which is currently held in disrepute, but was once 
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will concentrate on the use of the device in the control of sexual 
behavior because there have been more sophisticated statutory ap-
proaches, more judicial decisions, and more public concern on this 
subject than on others. From an exploration of the law's experience 
with the regulation of consent in this area, generalized conclusions 
can be drawn with respect to the problems of the whole field. 
Need for an Adequate Analytical Approach 
Meaningful legal analysis sometimes lags behind events. This 
may be the case with respect to governmental intervention in the 
lives of the mentally retarded. Forms of state control and interven-
tion change and become so sophisticated, appealing, subtle, and 
delicate that modern governmental action seems to be less and less 
restricted by an ordinary application of constitutional protections. 
For example, when government intervention primarily took the 
form of institutionalization, particularly compulsory institution-
alization, certain ideals of due process which had developed in the 
criminal law system could be brought to bear (with modifications 
to be sure), to increase the protection of the individual from arbi-
trary state action at the level of the institution. 
But times have changed, and the philosophy of care has 
changed as well. It is now at the budget and planning levels of state 
government where critical decisions are made, where individual 
rights are affected, and where ingenious arrays of government inter-
vention are packaged. New delivery strategies, particularly those 
incorporating community care and the normalization of the environ-
ment, present novel problems in ascertaining an appropriate bal-
ance between the state interest and individual rights. Because of the 
appeal of the new strategies, it is sometimes difficult even to main-
tain a critical approach. When the asylum6 emerged in the nine-
teenth century as the idyllic answer to a major societal problem, 
supported on third-party consent grounds, is child labor. See Parlin & Orendorff 
Co. v. Webster, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 631, 43 S.W. 569 (1897); In re Hollingsworth, 45 
La. Ann. 134, 12 So. 12 (1893); Brown v. Yaryan, 74 Ind. 305 (1881) . 
6. The mentally retarded were among the last group of handicapped persons 
for whom states realized any responsibility to provide facilities . Schools for the 
blind and deaf, and hospitals for the insane all were established before the first 
permanent state school for the retarded opened in Massachusetts on October 1, 
1848. A. A. Baumeister, The American Residential Institution: Its History and 
Character, in RESIDENTIAL FACILITIES FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED (Baumeister and 
Butterfield eds. 1970) . 
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delight in the approach it offered obscured what are now considered 
to be its obvious hazards. We are now in a similar period when the 
community approach goes virtually unchallenged: rhetoric of com-
mitment is replaced with rhetoric of encouragement; voluntary, 
family-centered techniques replace the cold hand of the state. Yet, 
the professional must remember to maintain some sense of critical 
balance and open-mindedness. 
When a modern state determines to intervene, for example by 
means of certain forms of treatment or sterilization, it offers modern 
justifications. "Positive ei.Igenics"7 are no longer in vogue, but the 
intense competition for tax dollars has merely replaced genetic con-
siderations with fiscal and psychological ones. Where the Holmes' 
statement, "three generations of imbeciles are enough," was suffi-
cient to uphold the constitutionality of intervention by sterilization 
a half-century ago, 8 we talk confidently in the compulsory 1970's 
about "parenting," of "breaking the vicious cycle" of three genera-
tions of welfare clients. Beyond these justifications, there is an addi-
tional factor which is the primary subject of this paper: through 
adroit statutory change and through nonstatutory efforts to confer 
power to consent on persons other than the individual directly af-
fected, the always thin line between involuntary and voluntary ac-
tion has been further attenuated to the point of disappearance. 
On a formal level, there is a vast chasm between the voluntary 
and the involuntary in our law. Morally, ethically, and legally we 
distinguish, separate, and scrutinize more strictly those interven-
tions by the state that are made without regard to the consent of 
affected persons. In criminal law, a test of the validity of a 
confession is whether it was "voluntarily" given; 9 in essence, only if 
the judicial process finds the element of voluntariness present, may 
the confession be considered on the question of guilt. To search a 
home, in most circumstances, the police need probable cause and 
must obtain a warrant unless an appropriate person "consents" to 
the search. 10 Consent is also an issue in torts and contracts: we are 
7. Policy of improving the human race through sterilization of subnormal 
persons, based on theories that most defects are transmissible from parent to child 
and that defective persons breed more frequently than normal persons. Kindregan, 
Sixty Years of Compulsory EU!(enic Sterilization: "Three Generations of Imbe-
ciles" and the Constitution of the United States, 43 CH1.-KENT L. R.Ev. 123 (1966). 
8. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
9. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1966) . 
10. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1960). 
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all familiar with the efforts of doctors to shield themselves from 
liability by having their patients sign "consent" forms prior to an 
operation. Involuntary commitment of the mentally ill is con-
strained and regulated in every state by means wholly distinguisha-
ble from procedures for voluntary admissions into a hospital or pro-
gram: for an involuntary patient, the statute usually states at least 
a minimal diagnostic standard for admission and release, and pro-
vides a set of procedural safeguards usually including some sort of 
court review before a lengthy involuntary detention can be sus-
tained. None of these safeguards are provided, however, if a pa-
tient's admission can be characterized as "voluntary." 
Consent and voluntariness are vital doctrines. Enormous conse-
quenses can flow from a finding that they are present or absent. 
Despite this importance, we know surprisingly little about the 
mechanism of consent and the forms states have undertaken to 
delineate consent. In particular, there is an area of consent that is 
virtually terra incognita: where the state lodges the power to consent 
in a person other than the patient-a parent, the legal guardian, or 
the institution itself. A survey of the statutes suggests that third-
party consent is a rather familiar process used by states to shift an 
activity from the involuntary to the voluntary category. Since cate-
gorizing an action as voluntary rather than involuntary has crucial 
implications, one might expect that there would be a well-developed 
analytical framework to determine whether truly involuntary ap-
proaches were being characterized as consensual. Unfortunately, no 
such analytical framework exists. 
Motives, Intent, and Justifications 
To understand the significance of "consensual" sterilization in 
the control of sexual behavior, it is useful to take a short backward 
glance at statutory attempts to make sterilization compulsory, and 
the declining use of these statutes as perceptions of "positive 
eugenics" changed through time. 
Two years after the governor of Pennsylvania vetoed the first 
American attempt at sterilization legislation in 1905, Indiana be-
came the first state to enact a compulsory sterilization law .11 There 
are now twenty-nine states with statutory provision for compulsory 
sterilization in a variety of circumstances. The Association for Vol-
11. IND. ACTS ch. 215 (1907) . 
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untary Sterilization reports that in the first half-century of its 
operation, these statutes compelled the sterilization of approxi-
mately 60,000 people on the basis that they posed a threat to them-
selves or to society. Compulsory sterilization as a form of criminal 
punishment has been disfavored and declared unconstitutional as 
"cruel and unusual." 12 There have also been intimations that a stat-
ute which compelled sterilization because of the potential financial 
drain on society posed by impecunious wards violates the Equal 
Protection Clause, 13 but the general power of the state to compel 
sterilization for therapeutic or preventive reasons has been upheld. 14 
Today it is necessary to direct new attention to the compulsory 
sterilization statutes and the motives behind their passage. Such 
attention is required by contemporary emphasis being placed on 
alternatives to long-term institutionalization for mental retardates, 
opening to them prospects of normal and productive life in the 
community. Under these alternatives, motives supporting compul-
sory sterilization persist; for there is not general agreement that all 
retardates who can benefit from this new emphasis, and who are 
biologically capable of procreation should become parents. For some 
there are serious genetic risks of bearing sadly limited children, but 
the genetic risks in childbearing are neither the state's primary nor · 
most widespread concern. Rather, emphasis is placed upon the fact 
that among retardates who will be living in sheltered settings, which 
give sufficient support for work and life in the community, one 
inevitably will find that certain of these individuals will lack those 
social and emotional attributes which are generally considered de-
sirable or, at the very least, necessary for child rearing. 
Though many state laws give authority for compulsory sterili-
zations based on assessments of either genetic or social incapaci-
ties, 15 it is false to give the impression that governments either frame 
adequate genetic and social standards or employ sufficiently skilled 
personnel to predict in advance who among the retarded should not 
become parents. Indeed, compulsory sterilization authority leads so 
readily to abuse that it is not surprising to find increased constitu-
tional awareness making it less and less a power that is likely to be 
invoked. Statistical data, though sparse, tends to suggest that the 
12. Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F.687 (D. Nev. 1918). But cf. State v. Feilen, 70 
Wash. 65, 126 P. 75 (1912). 
13. Cook v. State, 9 Ore. App. 224,495 P.2d 768 (1972). 
14. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
15. See, e.f? . , UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-10-7 (1968). 
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annual number of persons compulsorily sterilized has declined by 
almost half in the last twenty years. 
Emerpence of Constitutional Limitations 
State laws which single out the mentally retarded as being 
specially unsuited for parenthood are often derived more from com-
munity fear and prejudice than from any sensible conviction regard-
ing the particular incapacities of the retarded as a group. This spe-
cial vulnerability to sexual activity and child rearing restrictions is 
not limited to those who are mentally deficient, but is shared with 
many groups in this society which are stigmatized and isolated as 
deviants-in particular the prison and mental hospital population. 16 
Indeed, half of the twenty-three state laws which authorize compul-
sory sterilization for mentally retardates have similar provisions for 
"hereditary criminals." And virtually all the state statutes apply 
their sexual restrictions equally to t_he mentally retarded and the 
mentally ill. 17 
Furthermore, the stereotypes which are projected onto the men-
tally retarded, the mentally ill, and criminals are remarkably simi-
lar in their attribution of sexual appetite and dangerousness. The 
Supreme Court of Nebraska, in its 1968 opinion upholding the con-
stitutionality of the state's compulsory sterilization law for institu-
tionalized mental defectives, stated, "It is an established fact that 
mental deficiency accelerates sexual impulses and any tendencies 
toward crime to a harmful degree." 18 This statement, unsupported 
by any observed data, neatly summarizes popular prejudice regard-
ing not only the mentally ill and criminals, but other stigmatized 
groups. 
This phenomenon is related to the prevalence of sexual imagery 
and fears regarding blacks in this country. The laws which forbade 
intermarriage among blacks and whites-rationalized by a pot-
pourri of genetic and social arguments-have a close kinship with 
the restrictive laws applied to the mentally retarded. Indeed, one 
important attribute of slave status in this country was that slaves 
were forbidden to marry, and familial ties between parent and child 
16. See MORRIS & HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GumE TO CRIME CONTROL 
125-33 (1970). 
17. See LINDMAN & McINTYRE, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw (1961) . 
18. In re Cavitt, 182 Neb. 712,716, 157 N.W.2d 171, 177 (1968) . See Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1932). 
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were disregarded as a matter of course. 19 Mental retardates share 
with this other stigmatized group the popular perception of "less-
than-humanness" and likewise become the target and repository of 
a cluster of fears that are felt to assault our humanness in general. 
Among these fears, unabated sexual appetite ranks high. 
This special vulnerability of mental retardates as an irration-
ally feared and stigmatized group has important legal implications. 
It means that, as a group, they will require particular protection 
against the operation of unfair legislation, most notably that aimed 
at their sexual and child rearing behavior. Applying a legal analysis 
articulated by Chief Justice Stone in 1938, mental retardates are, 
"a discrete and insular minority ... [against whom prejudice] 
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes 
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, ... [on whose 
behalf] a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry [may be 
called forl,'' 20 
Since 1938, the Supreme Court has increasingly done battle for 
blacks-another such "discrete and insular minority"-deriving its 
task from a revised and clearer historical understanding of the pur-
poses of the Fourteenth Amendment and from Chief Justice Stone's 
vision of the role of the courts as protector of minority rights. In this 
pursuit, the Court has ruled unconstitutional state laws prohibiting 
marriage between blacks and other races in a case appropriately 
denominated Loving v. Virginia. 21 This result was directed by a 
prior series of Supreme Court holdings establishing the principle 
invalidating any form of state action that singled out blacks as a 
group for special derogatory treatment. 22 Regardless of whether an 
equally broad principle should be recognized by the courts to pro-
tect mental retardates, 23 their rights to sexual freedom must be 
judicially protected. 
Family and sexual conduct in our society, including the right 
"to marry, establish a home and bring up children,"24 the right of 
"privacy surrounding the marriage relationship,"25 and "the right to 
19. See FRANK TANNENBAUM, SLAVE AND CITIZEN (1946). 
20. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
21. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
22. The progenitor was Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
23. See Burt, LeRal Restrictions on Sexual and Familial Relations of Mental 
Retardates in HUMAN SEXUALITY AND THE MENTALLY RETARDED (de la Cruz and La 
Yeck eds. 1973). 
24. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
25. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
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satisfy lone'sl intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of 
lone'sl home,"28 have been acknowledged in various Supreme 
Court decisions as fundamental rights. However, for the mentally 
retarded, these familial and sexual freedoms are drastically in-
fringed by laws requiring sterilization and prohibiting marriage. 
The legislation we have been discussing does not impose disa-
bilities uniformly on all institutionalized mental retardates as such. 
For example, some statutes require sterilization only of those retar-
dates who are considered "not capable of performing the duties of 
parenthood."27 This standard is no more precise than the standard 
which governs state interventions to redress child neglect or abuse 
among the general population, and it could be considered unconsti-
tutionally vague as applied to a class limited to mental retardates. 
However uncertain its capacities to distinguish among good and bad 
parents generally, this society and its officialdom are clearly in the 
thralls of irrational attitudes toward the sexuality of the mentally 
retarded. Our officials share the inability of most people in this 
society to look at the retarded without fear or pity-to look at them 
with sufficient objectivity to permit sensible differentiation among 
them. Because the mentally retarded as a group are so readily vic-
timized, compulsory interventions in their childbearing activities 
which might be constitutionally tolerable for the general population 
is intolerable if limited to the retardate group alone. 28 
Mr. Justice Holmes' famous-indeed, notorious-1927 opinion 
in Buck v. Bell, 29 upholding a state compulsory sterilization law 
with the aphorism "three generations of imbeciles are enough," fails 
to appreciate this special role for the courts in protecting a vulnera-
ble minority. Fifteen years later, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 30 the Su-
preme Court's invalidation of a state's compulsory sterilization law 
for habitual criminals on grounds that it made irrational distinc-
tions between those criminals who should and those who should not 
be sterilized, suggests a different court attitude. However, the Court 
has not yet seen fit to administer the coup de grace to the general 
principle of compulsory sterilization.31 
26. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). 
27 . See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
28. See Cook v. Oregon, 9 Ore. App. 224, 495 P.2d 768 (1972). 
29. 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
30. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
31. In re Cavitt, 182 Neb. 712, 157 N.W.2d 171, rehearin,? denied, 183 Neb. 
243, 159 N.W.2d 566 (1968), appeal dismissed sub nom . Cavitt v. Nebraska, 396 
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A Potential Procedural Virtue Lost Through "Reform" 
Even though there is an aggregate of ills surrounding compul-
sory sterilization statutes, and even though these statutes are gener-
ally based on unsound and unscientific motives and have the poten-
tial to be discriminatorily applied, they do possess one aspect which 
might be considered a virtue: procedural safeguards. If the state is 
required to follow a statutory route to achieve an interventionist 
goal, certain legal effects usually follow: (1) it can be determined 
whether an individual has a right to a hearing before this particular 
form of intervention can take place; (2) courts can determine 
whether it is so serious a matter that there is a right to counsel; (3) 
if the intervention is labeled as involuntary and as a deprivation of 
an important basic human right, it may be that the state will have 
to demonstrate that there is no less restrictive alternative which will 
achieve the same purpose. Thus, requiring an involuntary act to be 
so denominated gives a clear picture of what is occurring, demands 
a recognition of the procedures that must be followed, and preserves 
a sharper record, in a sense, of the pattern of state intervention. 
However, one must note that the flood of substantive reform in the 
care of the mentally retarded has caused compulsory sterilization 
statutes along with any procedural protection they might have of-
fered to waste away through disuse; for just as society has been 
plagued by its fear of procreation by the mentally retarded, habitual 
criminal, and mentally ill, so also has society harbored a fear of 
empowering the state to engage in a program of eugenics. With the 
advance of communitization, there is increased pressure to restrict 
mentally retarded persons in their right to procreate. States may 
merely substitute techniques more palatable than compulsory steri-
lization to achieve much the same result. 
It is here that the issue of consent arises, as one of several 
possibilities. First, there is the likelihood that so-called "voluntary" 
or "consensual" sterilization will occur with increasing frequency, 
possibly including sterilization as a condition for deinstitutionali-
zation. 32 Second, it is possible that upgraded contraception will 
be used to replace compulsory sterilization, and that reliance on 
therapeutic abortions may become more frequent. Finally, it is 
possible that public concerns about the parenting qualities of men-
U.S. 996 (1970). Prior to the case coming before the Court, Nebraska repealed its 
compulsory sterilization statute. 
32. Id. 
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tal retardates can be assimilated into the general statutory enforce-
ment powers concerning neglected children. 
Consent 
There are degrees of retardation, understanding, and consent. 
At some point, consent cannot meaningfully come from the retarded 
patient himself. Yet, it is quite clear that through a broad recogni-
tion of the status of the parent, "consent" is being obtained to 
legitimize sterilizations that do not comply with the minimum 
standards which would be constitutionally required for involuntary 
treatment. A methodology which will protect the retarded individ-
ual's interests must be developed. One must ask who may qualify 
as a third-party consentor, how might they be selected, and by what 
criteria. It is hoped that these questions will be answered in the 
following section. 
The Role of the Patient 
In many, but not all states, the mentally retarded person must 
be consulted before a '.'voluntary" sterilization occurs. In those 
states questions arise which naturally lead to the issue of third-
party consent, for it must be acknowledged that there will be a class 
of cases, perhaps numerically large, where the consent of the patient 
himself will not meet minimum standards of knowing consent. But 
it is one thing to argue that the patient's consent is sufficient; it is 
quite another to argue that it is necessary. There are statutes that 
take each position, and they should be differentiated from others 
that allow the wishes of the third-party to be controlling regardless 
of the consent of the patient. 
Under the California statute, 33 consent is manifested in the 
following manner: when the superintendent decides that an institu-
tionalized mentally retarded person in his care can benefit from 
sterilization, he must notify that patient and other specified persons 
who may consent or object to the proposed procedure within thirty 
days. If no objection is received within this period, the patient is 
deemed to have consented. It appears from the statute that absent 
any objection, the consent of the patient, written or implied, suf-
fices. 
On the other hand, the Maine statute requires that where a 
33. CAL. WELF. & INST' NS CODE § 7254 (1972) . 
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sterilizing operation is indicated, the physician may recommend to 
the affected individual the advisability and necessity of the opera-
tion. At the outset, the patient himself may give written consent, 
but if the hospital seeks to proceed on the basis of that consent 
alone, a council of two doctors must be assembled to determine 
whether the person was "mentally capable of giving his consent."34 
In Michigan, the state can proceed to perform an operation 
when they have obtained the consent of a "defective person ... of 
the age of 16 years or more and not otherwise incapable of giving 
consent," together with the consent of a guardian or near relative. 35 
These two latter statutes, by not relying solely on the patient's 
consent, place the question of sufficiency in issue. 
Other statutes seem to suggest that a "voluntary" operation 
can occur without prior consultation with the patient. For example, 
Section 256.07 of MINN. STAT. ANN. provides that the commissioner 
of public welfare may authorize a sterilization operation "with the 
written consent of the spouse or nearest kin" of the patient. The 
Connecticut statute similarly relies wholly on the responsible next-
of-kin or guardian of the person involved.36 Statutes of this type 
usually place the burden on third parties either to initiate a request 
for sterilization, to object to a state recommendation that steriliza-
tion take place, or simply to "consent" to the operation. These 
statutes are of various kinds. 
In Minnesota the commissioner of public welfare serves as the 
legal guardian for all institutionalized retarded persons.37 As such, 
he may provide the exclusive consent where there is not a spouse or 
near relative. In other states, a guardian ad litem must be appointed 
to provide a specific consent to an operation. In some states, the 
objection of the third person (guardian or relative) is conclusive. In 
others, such an objection is only a factor to be considered by the 
board of the hospital and later by the court. 
Apart from specific procedures for sterilization outlined above, 
legal authority to make such choices on behalf of mental retardates 
appears in the guardianship laws in all states.38 Some such laws 
34. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 2461 (1964). 
35. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 720.304 (1966). 
36. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§§ 17-19 (1960). 
37. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256.07 (1971). 
38. This authority in Alabama now appears constrained by Wyatt v. Aderholt, 
368 F. Supp. 1383 (M.D. Ala. 1974). 
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authorize the appointment of custodians for, among others, men-
tally deficient persons who are not institutionalized but are none-
theless regarded as incompetent to handle a portion or all of their 
affairs. 39 The potential for abuse of these guardianship laws is clear. 
A case recently decided by the Kentucky Supreme Court should 
serve as a warning. In Strunk v. Strunk, 48 the court authorized the 
appointment of a 27-year old institutionalized retardate's mother as 
his guardian in order to permit her to consent on his behalf to 
remove one of his kidneys to donate to his otherwise doomed, intel-
lectually normal older brother. The court did not seem troubled by 
the fact that the mother's role in making this decision for her re-
tarded son could, at best, be characterized as ambivalent. 
In an early opinion of the Michigan Attorney General it was 
stated that parental consent to a sterilization operation is null and 
void because "the right to possess and retain the power of procrea-
tion is second only to life itself among the rights. . .guaranteed by 
the federal Constitution. It is a right that is personal to the child 
and is not merged with the right of control by the parent over the 
person of the child."41 It must now be asked how one can determine 
the circumstances when a parent or guardian third-party should be 
permitted to consent on behalf of the patient; and what factors 
should be considered in making this determination. 
One answer could be that we should never characterize as "con-
sent" any authorization for an operation where the subject individ-
ual has not provided his own informed consent or has been deter-
mined to be incompetent and unable to give knowing consent. 42 
However, this answer is perhaps too rigid. In Strunk, the evidence 
that the kidney transplant was a very low-risk surgical procedure for 
the donor while essential for preserving the life of the donee provides 
a circumstance in which this first solution might be too harsh. After 
all, does it truly serve an important social purpose to conclusively 
bar the "incompetent" donor from exercising the right that the 
"normal" population prizes as an ethical imperative-the right to 
give of one's self in order to help others?43 
39. See LINDMAN & McINTYRE, note 17 supra, at 204-05. 
40. 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969). 
41. OP. ATI'Y GEN . MICH. 230 (1921-22) . 
42. The debate over the testing of drugs in children may provide some guid-
ance on the issue of third-party consent . See Address by Dr. Irving Ladimer, Ross 
Conference, 1968, Problems of Dru!( Evaluation in Infants and Children. 
43. See Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 
331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964). 
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Perhaps the most compelling consideration militating against 
an absolute bar to sterilizations where the patient cannot give in-
formed consent is that the doctrinal rigors of this concept may pre-
vent one who truly desires such an operation from obtaining it. The 
right to elect sterilization is prized by many, and in the Supreme 
Court's recent decision on abortion, where various aspects of privacy 
within one's own person were discussed, one finds a constitutional 
dimension added to this attitude." Thus, it would be troubling both 
in a practical and constitutional sense for the state to single out a 
class of people who are not considered to be sufficiently "compe-
tent" to make certain choices which the Constitution guarantees to 
others. 
The state thus appears constrained by two competing com-
mands regarding sterilization: it must scrupulously respect in-
formed consent; yet, at the same time, it must give adequate scope 
for individual choice to be expressed and to prevail. Third-party 
consent can have some role in charting a line between these com-
mands, to help those who clearly need help in choosing. But no 
matter how scrupulously we work, no person can ever stand wholly 
for another. Third-party consent will always be a fiction, will always 
be somewhat arbitrary, and thus must always be narrowly circum-
scribed. 
Our first line of defense against the dangers of this fiction 
should be to forbid third-party consent to the sterilization of full-
time residents in state institutions. The reasons which previously 
led us to reject compulsory sterilization of institutionalized persons45 
apply equally to the purported "consensual" case. The weight of 
state coercion is often concealed behind the paperwork evidencing 
a guardian's choice to sterilize his institutionalized ward. The docu-
mented practice of parents admitting their children to Willowbrook 
in New York demonstrates that consent to a potentially harmful 
course of drug experimentation may be accepted by parents as the 
price for obtaining state institutionalization.48 Further, the deep-
seated social prejudice against the retarded-which led us in the 
first place to argue that they are a "suspect class" requiring protec-
tion against state-imposed sterilization-is often equally, or even 
more passionately, felt by the parents of these unfortunate children. 
44. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
45. See notes 21-31, supra and accompanying text. 
46. See Wade v. Bethesda Hospital, 356 F. Supp. 380 (S.D. Ohio 1973). 
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The general legal rule that guardians may dictate their ward's 
medical treatment is made tolerable in the context of the normal 
parent-child relationship by most parents' narcissistic identifica-
tion with their children and by powerful social attitudes against 
abuse of children.47 It has been traditionally believed that the parent 
will act for the benefit of the child, but for retarded children, most 
particularly those who are institutionalized, both of these con-
straints are often seriously eroded. Where the guardian is not a 
parent, such constraints may be even further attenuated. 
In addition, when consent for something as drastic as steriliza-
tion is to be given, a different line of defense, beyond that of ques-
tioning parental concern, has appeared. The sterilization guidelines 
of Wvatt u. Aderholt withhold sterilization from institutionalized 
minors except in case of medical emergency. 48 The question must 
now be asked: why should sterilization for any minor, institution-
alized or not, be permitted at parental discretion? The availability 
of less drastic birth control techniques suggests that individual au-
tonomy and personal privacy regarding sterilization would best be 
protected by forcing postponement of this irreversible decision until 
the socially sanctioned " age of discretion" is reached. Only at that 
age should the state distinguish between who can be considered 
"competent" and "incompetent" decision makers. By this analysis 
the truly unique characteristics of sterilization as a bodily intrusion 
are highlighted: its irreversibility, its general inadvisability except 
as a last resort, and its compelling psychological significance. News-
paper accounts alleging that etate officers coerced a welfare mother 
into consenting to her daughters' sterilizations suggests an added 
social reality that dictates protecting children by conclusively with-
holding sterilization from them.49 
The discussion thus far has centered upon two competing con-
cerns in regulating the proper use of third-party consent where state 
action otherwise would be characterized as an impermissible, invol-
untary intervention. In analyzing either of these, where the subject 
is institutionalized or is a minor, the relevance of apparently less 
intrusive alternatives to accomplish similar purposes must be con-
sidered. While application of this "less restrictive alternative" prin-
47. 64 Pa. D. and C. 14 (1948). 
48. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368 F . Supp. 1383, 1384 (M.D. Ala . 1974) (Standard 
2). 
49. N.Y. Times, Je. 27, 1973, at 43, col. 3. 
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ciple appears to merely postpone rather than conclude the hardest 
issues, and the rhetoric surrounding this concept may lead to abuse 
by obscuring what is less or more "restrictive", one must, due to the 
inherent nature of sterilization, examine such alternatives. 
Less Restrictive Alternatives 
One alternative that has enormous appeal is to replace the 
cumbersome and taboo-laden procedure of sterilization with non-
permanent contraception. In particular there is great hope in some 
quarters that there will soon be approved a self-executing contra-
ceptive, an injection for example, that will not rely on patient man-
agement. However, there could be opposition to the use of such an 
innovation, heralded for the mainstream of the population, on a 
class of retarded patients. 
· Zeal has a way of converting counseling and encouragement 
into something not dissimiliar to coercion. We must ask ourselves 
whether a practice which is a virtue when elected, becomes a vice 
when compelled. For the problem of voluntariness in a contracep-
tion program may be no easier than the problem of voluntariness in 
regard to sterilization. There are, however, differences that are 
striking enough to create a distinction. Contraception is not so dras-
tic an intervention as is sterilization; it is reversible; and it bears 
no stigma. Further, the decision to renew contraception can be 
taken at frequent intervals. 
But these are reasons only why compulsory contraception is 
constitutionally more palatable than compulsory sterilization; they 
do not begin to suggest why it is palatable enough. One must still 
face all the problems discussed above in administering any program 
leading to a nonvoluntary bodily intrusion, no matter how prefera-
ble this program might be to other alternatives. Undoubtedly, invol-
untary (or semi-involuntary) contraception will be a technique in-
creasingly used in the next decade as pharmacological advances are 
made and as the emphasis on community placement is reinforced. 
We view the trend cautiously and with trepidation, not so much 
because of the danger to individual rights of mentally retarded per-
sons as because of the precedents created. 
Here, the problem of categorization rises again. We must be 
sure that in styling the reasons why we make mentally retarded 
persons subject to a particular kind of involuntary treatment, we do 
not state reasons that in their breadth would bring in a large portion 
of the "normal" population. Fiscal irresponsibility and bad parent-
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ing are excellent reasons why persons should indulge in a program 
of contraception, but to use those criteria to mandate contraception 
would be inconsistent with our constitutional system. 
More difficult questions are presented by involuntary or semi-
voluntary abortions, particularly in the absence of known genetic 
defect in the fetus. The Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade50 
might have been a great victory for a woman's right to control the 
decision whether or not to bring her child to term; but to contend 
that doctors, guardians or parents have such a right to make a 
similar decision for a minor daughter or incompetent female ward 
would indeed strain the exegesis of that decision. Minor children in 
many jurisdictions have the right, without parental consent, to ob-
tain an abortion, but it is doubtful that there is a single jurisdiction 
in which a hospital would be allowed by law to permit an abortion 
at the parent's wish in disregard of the child's objection.51 Although 
the ethical problems are greater (depending on one's definition of 
the status of the fetus) in abortion than in contraception, it is possi-
ble that involuntary abortion will become increasingly common for 
mentally retarded pregnant women, who would formerly have been 
institutionalized but are now in the community. 
A final least restrictive approach to the issues presented by 
sterilization and its alternatives involves child neglect statutes. 
Almost every state has a statute broad enough to compel removal 
of a child from a parent who is regarded as incapable of child rearing 
because of mental deficiency. The Minnesota child neglect statute, 
for example, authorizes the . state to take custody of any child 
"whose . . . condition, environment or associations are such as to 
be injurious or dangerous to himself. "52 Inevitably the fears and 
prejudices that stigmatize mental retardates will intrude on the 
otherwise sound judgment of court and social agency personnel 
who apply these statutes. The numerous procedural guarantees 
-such as right to counsel and opportunity to rebut all adverse 
evidence-should be provided to all parents, including the mentally 
retarded, who are defendants in child abuse or neglect proceedings. 
Still, it is doubtful that statutory standards for state intervention 
can be so perfectly defined as to eliminate any possibility of misap-
50. 410 U.S . 113 (1973). 
51. See In re Smith, 16 Md. App. 209, 295 A.2d 238 (1972) , noted in 7 SUFFOLK 
U.L. REV. 1157 (1973). 
52. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.015 (Supp. 1965). See also Paulson, The Legal 
Framework of Child Protection, 66 CoLUM. L. REV. 679, 693-94 (1964). 
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plication without the risk of prohibiting state intervention to help 
children who are in serious, jeopardy from inadequate parenting.53 
The prophylatic principle which led to the argument that compul-
sory sterilization laws should be overturned cannot properly be ap-
plied to invalidate general child abuse and neglect laws. The oppor-
tunity for victimizing the mentally retarded in the application of 
these laws will thus, regrettably, remain a reality. This circum-
stance creates an obligation on the part of those agencies planning 
new modes of introducing retardates into community life to defend 
their clientele by family planning, contraceptive counseling, and 
appending special plans for intensive child rearing services to any 
plans for sheltered community living in which normal heterosexual 
contacts are envisioned. The need for such programs may be more 
urgently required for the retarded than for those parents in the 
"normal" population who share the child rearing disabilities of a 
portion of the mentally retarded population. The label of retarda-
tion threatens loss of rights to all who bear it. Special programs are 
needed to protect this entire group, not just those within it whom 
all "right-thinking people" would agree are incapable parents. 
We are not too far removed, in time or in ideology, from Justice 
Holmes and Buck v. Bell. 54 We are, however, too sophisticated to 
talk eugenics, at least out loud. The language of "fiscal responsibil-
ity" and "parenting environment" has a more appealing case than 
the rhetoric of "wards of the state" and "menace to society." There 
is little need now, and there will be less in the future, to resort to 
compulsory sterilization. More modern and more acceptable 
interventions-contraception and abortion-will eventually take its 
place. But we should realize that larger issues are at stake, involving 
the limits of proper societal intervention to restrict or encourage 
childbearing. For Justice Holmes, the principle that supported com-
pulsory vaccination supported the salpingectomy. It is yet unclear 
what a newfound principle of compulsory contraception of the men-
tally retarded might support. This uncertainty must give us all 
cause for concern. 
Selecting the Third-Party Consenter 
Finally, we turn to another critical element to be considered in 
53. See Burt, Forcin{? Protection on Children and Their Parents, 69 MICH. L. 
REV. 1259 (1971). 
54. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) . 
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regulating third-party consent to justify state-sanctioned interven-
tions: the method of choosing the third party. Who should be con-
sidered and what guidelines should be used to select the one who 
will be allowed to substitute his consent for that of the individual 
against whom the intervention will be made? For some "incompe-
tents," namely children, the law readily accepts parental consent 
for a vast range of interventions with virtually no external accounta-
bility, either before or after the decision, to protect children. The 
law has embraced the presumption that parents are more than ade-
quately dedicated to their children's interest and may therefore, 
without question, exercise this power. However, as with the theory 
of juvenile justice, it is now patent that this dream has little to 
recommend it in many important matters, and it appears to serve 
little purpose except to obfuscate analysis. Yet, with the mentally 
retarded, we are only beginning to reject the idea that parents can 
adequately act as surrogates for their children. 
Where the parent is not the guardian, the standard consenter 
is likely to be no different from the state itself. In Los Angeles it is 
the Public Conservator, which, like most other "helping" agencies, 
is a huge bureaucracy. This is not to say that the Public Conservator 
is bad per se, but one must acknowledge that third-party consent 
by any state-employed conservator is virtually the same as involun-
tary intervention by the state. There is no indication that the state's 
standards for commitment or sterilization are any different from 
those used by the conservator. However, it must be admitted that, 
even with the potential for great abuse, reliance on parents or on 
ordinary state bureaucracies to give consent for "incompetents" is 
sometimes appropriate. 
The propriety depends on what is proposed, where, and to 
whom. Thus, for example, a simple therapeutic operation such as a 
child's tonsillectomy can easily be seen to lie within parental discre-
tion. At the other extreme, sterilization, where solely intended as 
birth control, might be properly unavailable in any• circumstance. 
Likewise, participation in experimental drug programs may be at 
parental discretion only for those children who do not reside at state 
institutions; while for institutionalized children or for "retarded" 
adults, new agencies might be devised to provide adequate third-
party consent for a wide range of interventions. In situations where 
parents are not considered to be reliable protectors of their child, 
as when their personal involvements too readily obscure the proper 
perspective and where there is a danger that the programmatic 
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administrative considerations of an operating staff may mislead 
their discretion, new arrangements are needed. In effect, these agen-
cies could be analogous to public defenders, adequately staffed and 
trained to see the matter as much as possible as an alter ego for.the 
disabled party. While perhaps it is more comfortable and less ex-
pensive to pretend that parents or existing st~te employees can be 
totally trusted to act on behalf of their wards in all the matters 
discussed herein, it is time to recognize that this is a mere pretense. 
A different question, however, is presented in asking whether 
parents should be permitted to veto a proposed state intervention 
even though they are not empowered unilaterally to consent to it. 
Symmetry should not be seen as a requisite aesthetic standard in 
the development of legal rules. Just as there are good reasons to 
deny parents the power to consent unilaterally, there may be good 
reason to provide the family's and guardian's objections with sub-
stantial weight. A parental objection to an operation probably 
should have more weight than a parental consent. The parent may 
be expressing a religious or philosophical norm that is important to 
the family and to each member of it. This objection should be 
persuasive, though not conclusive. 
The issue of what would constitute an appropriate tribunal 
remains unresolved. Basically, a panel is needed that has no conflict 
of interest and that can separate the question of desirability of the 
operation from the question of capacity of the person to consent.55 
After all, the inappropriateness of involuntary sterilization is partly 
a consequence of the inappropriateness of the decision making pro-
55. "No sterilization shall be performed without the prior approval of a Review 
Committee formed in accordance with this paragraph. The Review Committee 
shall consist of five members, and shall be selected by the Partlow Human Rights 
Committee and approved by the Court . The members shall be so selected that the 
Committee will be competent to deal with the medical, legal, social, and ethical 
issues involved in sterilization; to this end, at least one member shall be a licensed 
physician, at least one shall be a licensed attorney, at least two shall be women, 
at least two shall be minority group members, and at least one shall be a resident 
of the Partlow State School (the foregoing categories are not mutually exclusive) . 
No member shall be an officer, employee, or agent of the Partlow State School, nor 
may any member be otherwise involved in the proposed sterilization. 
Any fees or costs incurred by reason of services performed by the Review 
Committee, including reasonable fees for the physician and the attorney, shall be 
paid by the Alabama Department of Mental Health upon a certification of reasona-
bleness by the Partlow Human Rights Committee." Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368 F. 
Supp.1383, 1384-85 (M.D. Ala . 1974) (Standard 5). 
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cess which forces persons to make decisions which are incapable of 
ethical resolution. 
Third Party Consent: Some Conclusions 
It is clear that the control of sexual behavior is not the only 
pressing issue involving third-party consent and mentally retarded 
persons. Medical decisions relating to the giving or withholding of 
treatment, the form of treatment decided upon, drug experimenta-
tion, and admission to hospitals raise problems that are equally 
significant. However, the purpose of this paper has been to develop 
an analysis by which aspects of third-party consent in the steriliza-
tion issue can be applied to other areas of mental health. For exam-
ple, third-party consent to drug experimentation that is not de-
signed to benefit the patient as an individual should not be an 
adequate warrant for such experimentation to proceed. There is fear 
enough that disadvantaged populations, such as the institution-
alized retarded, are singled out for drug experimentation. Providing 
the opportunity for third-party consent makes it more likely that 
non-competent groups will be increasingly the subject of such tests. 
If testing must take place, it should be according to ethics-moral 
and constitutional standards that are non-discriminatory both in 
form and in application. 
Admission and status in hospital facilities also pose interesting 
issues. There is no suitable way of differentiating between third-
party consent admissions and involuntary admissions unless it can 
be confidently assumed that the third party is a fit and conflict-free 
surrogate for the patient. If one were able to design fine and discrete 
levels of procedural safeguards, it would be possible to say that the 
protections surrounding involuntary admissions can be derogated to 
the extent that the third party can be said to be harmoniously 
identified with the patient's best interests. 58 Certainly, patients 
admitted under third-party consent procedures should not have 
diminished review rights in comparison with persons who are invol-
untarily committed. It is an irony of the present system that persons 
"voluntarily" committed by a guardian or conservator may never 
56. Of course this analysis presupposes that there are safeguards surrounding 
the involuntary admissions process. We appreciate that there is something formal 
about this analysis in that the procedural standards in many jurisdictions are 
either inadequately developed or imperfectly administered. It is, however, most 
likely, that third-party consent techniques are used most frequently in those states 
where involuntary admissions are the most difficult to obtain. 
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have judicial review of their custody while "involuntary" patients 
may have very certain limits to their stay. This class of detainees is 
in a sense "twice-cursed." There is neither the assumed personal 
control over release and treatment that is the basis for regular vol-
untary status nor the growing set of protections for those 
involuntarily detained. There is nothing in their status which justi-
fies this discrimination. 
In conclusion, the outstanding aspect of third-party consent is 
that it usually includes the hazards of a purely involuntary state 
intervention without the cluster of safeguards that have been devel-
oped to surround state action in other fields. Our predictive (though 
not empirically demonstrated) conclusion is that there is a trend 
toward third-party consent to cover many transactions that would 
have been justified by pure state intervention at a time when such 
action · was more palatable and available. In some circumstances, 
and to us they are in current practice among the most outrageous, 
a third party can consent to an action that is actually forbidden to 
the state acting with proper procedural safeguards. Third-party 
consent may have been an attempt to humanize and render more 
informal and more individual a system that seemed rigid and un-
yielding, but in the course of development, the technique may well 
have led to automatic, unreviewable state interventions. And often, 
resort to third-party consent may be a way of avoiding the "less 
restrictive alternative" analysis. 
We do not mean to suggest in this article that there is no room 
for a third-party authorization of state intervention in the lives of 
persons who are mentally ill or mentally retarded. We are suggest-
ing, rather, that the identity of persons so authorized, the process 
by which they come to have such power, and the restrictions or 
choices open to them must be much more closely analyzed. At pres-
ent, the technique of third-party consent is a burgeoning failsafe, 
resorted to more and more frequently as other routes to state inter-
vention become difficult to follow. However, the fictitiousness of 
current justification for the practice suggest that there will be more 
and more attacks upon it in the future. Courts must begin to wonder 
who a guardian is and how his selection gives him life and liberty 
depriving powers. 
